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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTION 
Plaintiff/appellant (hereinafter "Nielsen") filed a petition 
for rehearing November 27, 1992. Upon review, the Court requested 
defendants/respondents (hereinafter "Metropolitan") to file an 
answer to the petition, which answer was filed on February 22, 
1993. In its reply, Metropolitan presented arguments and evidence 
which had never been raised either in the district court or before 
this Court. Additionally, Metropolitan stated in its response that 
the Petition was frivolous, and asked for attorney fees. Nielsen 
objects to Metropolitan's raising a completely new issue and to 
Metropolitan's misrepresentations regarding that issue. Nielsen 
also addresses Metropolitan's request for sanctions. Accordingly, 
Nielsen submits the following response to Metropolitan's Answer to 
Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RELATED CASE CITED BY RESPONDENTS DID NOT 
AFFECT THE PRE-JUDGMENT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
Metropolitan's first point is that "this court did not 
overlook or misapprehend any issues or facts in reaching its 
decision." In spite of that statement, however, Metropolitan cites 
to and attaches documents from a related lawsuit never previously 
discussed in connection with this case either in the court below or 
1 
in this Court, to which documents Nielsen objects and moves to 
strike the same. 
Metropolitan's primary argument is a claim that Nielsen filed 
and received a settlement in another action, Richard H. Nielsen v. 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co., Civil No. C9l-1658 
("Related Case") , which encompassed the pre-judgment interest 
claimed for Metropolitan's alleged breach of contract in this case. 
Metropolitan then argues that in light of the Related Case, 
Nielsen "filed a frivolous petition for rehearing.'' In asserting 
that argument, Metropolitan misstates the actual circumstances of 
the other litigation, the settlement and the release executed in 
that case. In citing a portion of one sentence in the Release of 
All Claims, Metropolitan conveniently fails to note the express 
language in the Release which recognized and preserved the separate 
and distinct claims pending in the instant case: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of this release, the 
undersigned expressly reserves all claims against 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company now 
pending before the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Richard H. Nielsen v. Mark O'Reilly, Linda R. French and 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co., Case 
number 900489. 
(Exhibit G to Respondents' Answer to Petition for Rehearing, p. 2). 
As evidenced by the briefs, which had already been filed and 
argued at the time of the Release, Nielsen's entitlement to pre-
judgment interest on the contract was undisputedly one of the 
issues "pending before the Utah Supreme Court" in the instant case. 
2 
The plain wording of the Release itself thus established the 
inappropriateness of Metropolitan's current claim that the pre-
judgment interest issue was resolved in the related case. In fact, 
in correspondence between the parties' counsel, the release's 
reservation of all claims pending before this Court was expressly 
insisted upon by Nielsen's counsel and agreed to by Metropolitan's 
counsel. Nielsen would not have settled the related case without 
the reservation of claims. (Affidavit of Humpherys, Exhibit A}. 
Metropolitan similarly fails to mention the fact, expressly 
recognized by Judge Murphy, that the claims in this case and the 
related case were not the same. In fact, Metropolitan it filed a 
motion for summary judgment in the related case, making essentially 
the same argument and arguing that res judicata barred the claims 
in the related case. (Exhibit C to Respondent's Answer to Petition 
for Rehearing, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment). Nielsen's response to that motion, however, 
pointed out consistently and repeatedly that the contractual 
liability alleged in the instant case is separate and distinct from 
the extra-contractual liability asserted in the related case. 
(Exhibit D to Respondents' Answer to Petition for Rehearing, 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
Judge Murphy recognized the distinction, and held that 
plaintiff's claims in the related case were not the same as that 
3 
asserted in the instant case, and that res judicata did not apply. 
(Exhibit E to Respondents' Answer to Petition for Rehearing, 
Memorandum Decision and Order). 
Metropolitan further fails to recognize the fact that, in the 
related case, plaintiffs did not assert a claim for breach of the 
express terms of the contract. Instead, Nielsen's claims were for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
misrepresentation, warranty, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, based upon allegations of improper motivation 
and unlawful conduct, such as bad faith, malice, and false 
warranties and representations. (Exhibit B to Respondents' Answer 
to Petition for Rehearing). 
By contrast, in this case Nielsen is seeking pre-judgment 
interest solely in connection with Metropolitan's liability under 
the express terms of the contract. As noted in Nielsen's briefs on 
the merits, such pre-judgment interest is not conditioned upon, or 
otherwise tied to, unlawful conduct by an insurer. Instead, 
Metropolitan's breach of contract in itself entitled plaintiff to 
pre-judgment interest on the amount due under the contract. In the 
related case, Nielsen would have prevailed only if he could 
establish unlawful conduct, particularly bad faith, 
misrepresentation, or intentional infliction. Such unlawful 
conduct is irrelevant to the issue of pre-judgment interest in the 
present case. 
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In rejecting Metropolitan's res judicata argument in the 
related case, Judge Murphy noted that "[d]efendant's motion 
requires the Court to compare the claim in the first case with the 
claim in the instant case." After thorough analysis, Judge Murphy 
concluded that, "[w) hile the facts pertinent to each case do 
overlap somewhat, there is a sufficient distinction that plaintiff 
is not precluded by the first case from pursuing the claims in the 
instant case." (Exhibit E to Respondents' Answer to Petition for 
Rehearing, Memorandum Decision and Order). 
Metropolitan necessarily recognized the distinct nature of the 
claims in the two cases when it permitted Nielsen to condition 
settlement of the related case upon preservation of all claims then 
pending in the appeal before this Court. In fact, Metropolitan 
recognizes elsewhere in its answer to the petition for rehearing 
that "Nielsen's claim against Metropolitan in this case was not a 
bad faith action." (Answer to Petition for Rehearing, p. 9). For 
Metropolitan to claim now that the related case resolved the pre-
judgment interest issue -- in spite of the express language of the 
release and Judge Murphy's ruling -- is highly inappropriate in 
light of the undisputable circumstances of both cases. 1 
It is even more questionable for Metropolitan to compound 
its inappropriate conduct by stating that "Nielsen should 
voluntarily withdraw his petition for rehearing, apologize to this 
Court for having filed a frivolous petition for rehearing, and 
volunteer to pay Metropolitan's costs and attorneys' fees incurred 
by having to respond to the rehearing petition," and that "this 
5 
POINT II 
NIELSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM WAS 
ADEQUATELY STATED AND WAS EXPRESSLY RESERVED 
AT TRIAL. 
Metropolitan also contends that Nielsen's complaint should not 
be read to encompass a breach of contract claim. With respect to 
this argument, petitioner noted in its initial brief that, under 
the language of the complaint and well-established principles of 
notice pleading, Nielsen did state a claim for breach of contract 
below. Nielsen also pointed to Metropolitan's own repeated 
recognition of Nielsen's claim as based in contract. Those points 
will not be repeated here. In disputing these assertions, however, 
Metropolitan apparently suggests that the allegations should not be 
read that way because Metropolitan did not completely refuse 
payment, but only disputed the amount of payment owing. This 
distinction appears to overlook the fact that a breach of contract 
may-- and frequently does -- arise not simply from refusal to pay, 
but from payment of an amount less than the actual amount owing. 
Nielsen does not quite comprehend Metropolitan's additional 
assertion that the claim was not presented to the jury. As 
Metropolitan is aware, its contract liability was expressly 
Court should mandate that such action take place. " Even if 
Metropolitan's current position were the result of lack of 
knowledge by Metropolitan's present counsel (see Affidavit of L. 
Rich Humpherys, attached hereto as Exhibit A), rather than 
intentional misstatement, it is improper to make such an 
objectionable statement without sufficient information. 
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reserved by the parties and was not to be presented to the jury. 
( R. 55 3 I pp . 1-17 ) . It is obviously unfair for Metropolitan to 
agree to keep the issue of contract liability from the jury, then 
argue that the issue should not be addressed because it was not 
presented to the jury. 
IT IS APPROPRIATE 
NIELSEN'S ARGUMENT 
FOR FAILURE TO PAY 
AND TO CONSIDER 
DIRECTIVE. 
POINT III 
FOR THIS COURT TO REHEAR 
THAT INTEREST IS AVAILABLE 
THE CONTRACT AMOUNT TIMELY 
EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE 
Nielsen also asks this Court to address his argument that, 
even if the action against Metropolitan were not grounded in 
contract, he would be entitled to pre-judgment interest if 
Metropolitan knew or should have known that it would have to pay 
policy limits to Nielsen, and failed to do so promptly. 
Metropolitan first suggests that this argument may not be raised in 
the petition for rehearing because it was already briefed by the 
parties for the Court. In arguing that such an assertion is not 
proper grounds for a petition for a rehearing, Metropolitan fails 
to note the grounds set forth in U.R.A.P. 35, which allows 
rehearing if the reviewing court has overlooked a particular 
argument. Respondents do not cite to any portion of the opinion in 
which the argument was addressed, but simply note that the argument 
was briefed for the Court. It is precisely this type of situation 
which is contemplated by Rule 35. 
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Respondents next argue that there is nothing in the record to 
support the factual assertion that Metropolitan knew or should have 
known that it was obligated to pay policy limits to Nielsen, and 
that it was not presented to the jury. Again, Metropolitan fails 
to mention the fact that the issues of Metropolitan's contract 
liability, including pre-judgment interest, were expressly reserved 
by the parties and was not to be presented at trial. Moreover, 
Metropolitan moved to exclude the policy from evidence and any 
reference to policy limits. This motion was granted by the trial 
court. If wasn't until the parties had rested, just before closing 
statements, that Metropolitan changed its position and asked the 
court to accept the policy as an exhibit. (R. 553, pp. 1-17). 
Following the trial, Nielsen presented his argument on 
contract liability to the trial court. Among the arguments 
specifically raised by Nielsen was that Metropolitan would be 
liable for pre-judgment interest on the amount due under its 
contract if Metropolitan knew or should have known that it should 
have paid that amount earlier, and failed to do so. Although the 
very circumstances of the case, including a verdict nearly three 
times Metropolitan's policy limits, pointed strongly to 
Metropolitan's breach, at the very least a factual issue was 
presented which the trial court should not have resolved by 
granting summary judgment. The circumstances illustrating this 
8 
factual issue were set forth by Nielsen in his substantive briefs 
and petition for rehearing. 
Metropolitan next points to this Court's citation to two cases 
from other jurisdictions "for the proposition that an insurer is 
not liable for pre-judgment interest in excess of its policy 
1 imi ts. " As is plain from the opinion, however, the Court's 
citation of the cases was in connection with Nielsen's argument 
based upon the definition of "damages" in the policy. (Exhibit A, 
Opinion, p 10). Recognizing this Court's contrary ruling on that 
issue, Nielsen has not raised the issue in the Petition for 
Rehearing. However, the court did not appear to address Nielsen's 
argument concerning timeliness of payment. It is that issue of 
which Nielsen seeks rehearing. 
Finally, Metropolitan disagrees with Nielsen's assertion that 
the legislature has provided direction indicating a public policy 
of requiring payment of pre-judgment interest on overdue insurance 
payments. The relevant Insurance Code provisions are set forth in 
the Petition, and will not be set forth again here. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 31A-26-301(1); 31-41-8 [now 31A-22-309(5)]. While Metropolitan 
characterizes Section 31A-26-301(1) as "random statutory language" 
(and does not address Section 31-41-8), it would seem difficult to 
find a provision more indicative of legislative directive. The 
section applies to all insurance claims, and expressly indicates 
that "reasonable interest rates" are to be charged on late 
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payments. Indeed, it is clear that the legislature assumes such 
interest is available. As discussed further in the Petition, this 
section provides the "legislative directive" sought by this Court, 
demonstrating the legislature's intent to require insurers to pay 
interest in addition to the "late payments" themselves. This 
position is consistent with the fact that pre-judgment interest is 
available in virtually all other contract claims, and is in 
addition to the amount due under the contract itself. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and in the Petition for 
Rehearing, Nielsen requests the Court to grant the petition. 
q-;1.. 
DATED this {) day of March, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
..... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
: ............ ~:·"" 
This is to certify that on the .. ____: __ day of March, 1993, four 
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing OBJECTION AND REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING were mailed, first-class postage 
prepaid, to: 
Glenn c. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter .. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff /Petitioner 
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EXHIBIT A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
v. 
MARK O'REILLY, LINDA R. FRENCH 
and METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & 
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 900489 
Priority No. 16 
AFFIDAVIT OF L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Glenn C. Hanni 
STRONG & HANNI 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
L. Rich Humpherys, 1582 
Karra J. Porter, 5223 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
L. Rich Humpherys, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and represent Richard H. Nielsen 
herein. I also represented Richard H. Nielsen in a case against Metropolitan Property & 
Liability Insurance Company, civil number 910901658PI, before Judge Michael R. Murphy, 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Bad Faith Action"). 
2. A complaint in the Bad Faith Action was filed on or about March 15, 1991, wherein 
Richard H. Nielsen claimed causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, misrepresentation, warranty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Metropolitan moved to dismiss Nielsen's complaint upon the grounds that the present action 
would preclude the Bad Faith Action based upon res judicata. This motion was extensively 
briefed and argued. On December 11, 1991, Judge Murphy entered a six page memorandum 
decision denying Metropolitan's motion, finding that the causes of action and claims in the Bad 
Faith Action were separate from the present action. 
3. On or about March 4, 1992, the parties reached a settlement of the "Bad Faith 
Action," which settlement expressly reserved all claims that Richard Nielsen had against 
Metropolitan that were pending before the Utah Supreme Court in the present action. See page 
2 of the Release attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
4. The negotiations leading to the settlement of the "Bad Faith Action" were between 
myself and Barbara L. Maw, an attorney who at the time was working for Strong & Hanni. The 
reservation referred to in the above paragraph was expressly bargained for and included all 
claims against Metropolitan, including prejudgment interest, that were raised in the present 
appeal. Nielsen would not have settled the "Bad Faith Action" upon the same terms without said 
reservation provision. On March 3, 1992, Barbara Maw sent me a general release which did 
not contain said reservation. On March 4, 1992, I discussed with Barbara Maw the fact that her 
release did not contain the reservation. She asked me to draft the reservation and submit it to 
her for approval. I did this by a facsimile transmittal and correspondence. See Exhibit 2 
attached hereto. She contacted me shortly thereafter on the same day and approved the proposed 
reservation provision and Richard Nielsen signed the same. I returned the Release with 
correspondence that confirmed her approval. See Exhibit 3 attached hereto. 
5. The Order of Dismissal signed by Judge Murphy contained the qualifying words, 
"Based on the terms of the Release of All Claims signed by plaintiff on March 4, 1992 ... " See 
Exhibit 4 attached hereto. 
6. In the course of the negotiations and settlement of the "Bad Faith Action" I had no 
dealings or communications with Robert Janicki, who I understand was the principal drafter of 
the respondent's current brief opposing the petition for rehearing, nor with Glenn Hanni. 
DATED this ~ay of March, 1993. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this_ day of March, 1993. 
~~tLD'ritiJ 
N tary Pubhc 
EXHIBIT 1 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned 
of the total sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($180,000), including costs accrued, the receipt of-which is 
hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, RICHARD NIELSEN, hereby 
forever releases and discharges METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and any and all other persons, firms, and 
corporations, from and of any and all claims, demands, benefits, 
either past or future, causes of action both for property damage 
and bodily injury, damages, costs, losses, expenses or 
compensation, or any claims of any kind on account of or in any 
way arising out of or associated with the claims handling, 
adjustment, and settlement of a loss which occurred and arose out 
of an incident on or about April 28, 1983, including but limited 
to any claims for breach of contract breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, warranty, and 
intentional infliction of emotinal distress. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the 
injuries sustained by the undersigned are or may be permanent and 
progressive and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and 
indefinite and in making this release and agreement, it is 
understood and agreed that the undersigned relies wholly upon his 
own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent and 
duration of said injuries and in granting this complete release, 
he does not rely upon anything told to him or represented to him 
by the persons, firms, or corporations who are being released, or 
by any person or persons representing him. 
Particularly, the undersigned releases the persons and 
companies referred to above from and of all causes of action, 
claims, demands, costs, expenses or compensation as set forth in 
that certain complaint on file in the Third Judicial District 
court of Salt Lake county, state of utah, wherein Richard Nielsen 
is plaintiff and Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 
Company is defendant, Civil No. 910901658PI. 
The undersigned further understands and agrees that this 
settlement is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and 
that payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of any of the persons or companies referred to above 
and who are released herein and by whom liability is expressly 
denied. 
The undersigned authorizes and consents to stipulate to a 
dismissal with prejudice on the merits of that certain action 
pending in the Third Judicial District court of salt Lake county, 
State of Utah, which is referred to above. 
107148 
1151-167 
Notwithstanding the provisions of this release, the 
undersigned expressly reserves all claims against Metropolitan 
Property & Liability Insurance Company now pending before the Utah 
supreme Court in the case of Richard H. Nielsen v. Mark O'Reilly, 
Linda R. French and Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance 
Co., Case number 900489. 
The undersigned further acknowledges and accepts the advice of 
counsel in the settlement of this matter and that this is a fully, 
complete and final release of the above-named parties for any 
matter or thing done or omitted to be done by said parties, and as 
a result of the incident referred to above. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing 
release of all claims, know the contents thereof, and that I sign 
the same as my own free act, and it is my intention to be legally 
bound thereby. 
DATED this 4~day of March, 1992. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On this ~~day of March, 1992, before me personally appeared 
RICHARD NIELSEN, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the 
person who executed the foregoing document. 
Residing at -S~~~~~·(~)~J: ____________ __ 
EXHIBIT 2 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM 
STRONG & HANNI 
: ACSIMILE NUMBER:. _ ____:5:....:9:_6:._-_1_5:_0:_8 ____ _ 
rOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (Including cover page):. ___ 3 __ _ 
)ATE: March 4, 1992 
=ROM: I. Rich Hnmpberys 
FACSIMILE #801-355-3472 
F YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO: 
(801) 355-3431 ___ J_u_l_i_e 
,e: 
------------------------------------------
\i1essage: ___________________________________ _ 
rHIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) OR ENTITY FOR WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED, AND 
VIAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE 
LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE 
FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, 
DISTRIBUTION OR COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU RECEIVE THIS COMMUNICATION 
lN ERROR, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ABOVE 
A.DDRESS VIA THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU. 
RAY R. CHRISTENSE:N 
..JAY E . ..JENSEN 
ELWOOD P. POWELl- • 
RlCHARD L. EVANS""" 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
DALE ..J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S.WINEGARt 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM ..J. HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIPS. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M WALDBILLIG 
CRAIG V. WENTZ tt 
LEE C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
KELLY H. MACFARLANE 
KARRA ..J. PORTERttt 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
RUSSELL G. WORKMAN 
STE:PHEN R. HADFIELD 
DAVID C. RICHARDS 
VIA FAX 
Barbara Maw 
Strong & Hanni 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN &. POWELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
175 SOUTH W1:5T TI:MPLI:, SUITt: 510 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELI:PHONE (801) 355-3431 
FAX (801) 355-3472 
March 4, 1992 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. Metropolitan 
Dear Barbara: 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
(1BB6 -1979) 
"ALSO LICENSED IN WASH.,O.C.AND COlORADO 
•• ALSO LICENSED IN CALifORNIA 
t ALSO LICENSED IN ARIZONA 
t t ALSO LICENSED IN WASHINGTON STAT£ 
tt+ALSO LICENSED IN TEXAS 
Pursuant to our discussion, I am faxing you the second page of 
the release wi~h the additional paragraph regarding the reservation 
of all claims pending before the Utah Supreme Court in the first 
action. I also changed the date. otherwise the release is 
unchanged. 
Upon your approval, I will have the same executed by Richard 
Nielsen. 
LRH/jkc 
Enclosure 
Very truly, 
~;:EN, JENSEN & POWELL 
L. Rich Humpherys 
I ,: .J-'; ''- . /,· 
The undersigned further acknowledges and accepts the advise 
of counsel in the settlement of this matter and that this is a 
full, complete and final release of the above-named parties for 
any matter or thing done or omitted to be done by said parties, 
and as a result of the incident referred to above. 
I further state that I have carefully read the foregoing 
release of all claims, know the contents thereof, and that I sign 
the same as my own free act, and it is my intention to be legally 
bound thereby. 
DATED this day of February, 1992. 
STATE OF UTAH 
county of Salt Lake 
} 
) ss. 
) 
RICHARD NIELSEN 
on this day of February, 1992, before me personally 
appeared RICHARD NIELSEN, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) 
to be the person who executed the foregoing document. 
My Commission Expires: 
107148 
1151-1.67 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
EXHIBIT 3 
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
.JAY E . .JENSEN 
::_wooD P, POWELL • 
RICHARD L. EVANS" .. 
ROGER P. CHRISTENSEN 
DALE .J. LAMBERT 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS 
TODD S. WINE:GARt 
DENTON M. HATCH 
WILLIAM .J, HANSEN 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY 
PHILLIPS. FERGUSON 
ROGER R. FAIRBANKS 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
GAINER M WALDBILLIG 
CRAIG V. WENTZ tt 
LEE: C. HENNING 
WESLEY M. LANG 
KE:L~ H. MACFARLANE: 
KARRA .J, PORTE:Rttt 
MARK L. ANDERSON 
RUSSELL G. WORKMAN 
STEPHEN R. HADFIELD 
DAVID C. RICHARDS 
HAND DELIVERED 
Barbara Maw 
Strong & Hanni 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CHRISTENSEN. JENSEN & POWELL 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
175 SOUTH WEST TEMPLE:, SUITE: 510 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 355-3431 
FAX (801\ 355-3472 
March 5, 1992 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Nielsen v. Metropolitan 
Dear Barbara: 
E:. R. CH RISTE:NSE:N 
(1B86- 1979) 
• AlSO UCE:NSED IN WASH.,D C.ANO COLORADO 
*•ALSO liCENSED IN CAliFORNIA 
t ALSO LlCEHS(O IN ARIZONA 
++ALSO LICENSED IN WASHINGTON STATE 
t++ALSO LICENSED IN TEXAS 
I enclose the executed release and stipulation as modified and 
approved by you. The changes were made to clarify that all claims 
of Richard Nielsen on appeal in the prior case, are reserved. 
As always, we appreciate your professional demeanor. 
LRH/jkc 
Enclosure 
Very truly, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
L. Rich Humpherys 
EXHIBIT 4 
~~enn C. Hanni #A1327 
Barbara L. Maw #4081 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Metropolitan Ins. Co. 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
MAR 1 8 1992 
I SJ.i.. T LAKE COuN·;y ~~ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
RICHARD H. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY & 
LIABILITY INSURANCE CO., 
STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 910901658PI 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Based on the terms of the Release of All Claims signed by 
plaintiff on March 4, 1992, the stipulation signed by counsel and 
the motion of the above parties, through their respective counsel, 
and good cause therefore appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the above-
entitled action be and is dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits, with the parties to bear their own respective costs. 
BY THE COURT: 
By·/ s) Y- Honorable Michael Murphy 
District Judge 
